Journal
of Economic Theory, March 2019
Green Table of Contents
Volume 180
Pages 1-438
On the
equivalence of robustness to canonical and general
elaborations
Kym Pram
Pages
1-10
Pure-strategy
equilibria in Bayesian games
Wei He,
Yeneng Sun
Pages
11-49
(Green
copy not found)
Using
cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
Daeyoung
Jeong
Pages
50-80
Matching
with single-peaked preferences
Sophie
Bade
Pages
81-99
Opportunistic
conformism
Gary
Charness, Michael Naef, Alessandro Sontuoso
Pages
100-134
(Green
copy not found)
Necessary
and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus
security
Charles
Z. Zheng
Pages
135-166
Efficient
and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
Jun Zhang
Pages
167-177
(Green
copy not found)
Pivotal
persuasion
Jimmy
Chan, Seher Gupta, Fei Li, Yun Wang
Pages
178-202
Inattention
and belief polarization
Kristoffer
P. Nimark, Savitar Sundaresan
Pages
203-228
Implementation
in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto
correspondence and
a generalization
Saptarshi
Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers, Arunava Sen
Pages
229-243
(Green
copy not found)
Axiomatic
characterization of committee scoring rules
Piotr
Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko
Pages
244-273
Communication
under language barriers
Francesco
Giovannoni, Siyang Xiong
Pages
274-303
Learning
about analysts
Jesper
RŸdiger, Adrien Vigier
Pages
304-335
Repeated
implementation: A practical characterization
Helmuts
Āzacis, PŽter Vida
Pages
336-367
Unique
monetary equilibrium with inflation in a stationary
BewleyÐAiyagari model
Tai-Wei
Hu, Eran Shmaya
Pages
368-382
Optimal
learning before choice
T. Tony
Ke, J. Miguel Villas-Boas
Pages
383-437