Journal
of Economic Theory, May 2020
Green Table of Contents
Rational
buyers search when prices
increase
Luís Cabral,
Sonia Gilbukh
The income
fluctuation problem and the
evolution of wealth
Qingyin Ma,
John Stachurski, Alexis
Akira Toda--UP
Estimating
information cost functions
in models of rational inattention
Ambuj Dewan,
Nathaniel Neligh
A
theoretical foundation of ambiguity
measurement
Yehuda
Izhakian
Pure
strategy Nash equilibria of large
finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games
Guilherme
Carmona, Konrad Podczeck--UP
Testing,
disclosure and approval
Jacopo
Bizzotto, Jesper Rüdiger, Adrien
Vigier
On stable
and efficient mechanisms for
priority-based allocation problems
Kang Rong,
Qianfeng Tang, Yongchao
Zhang
Information
order in monotone decision
problems under uncertainty
Jian Li,
Junjie Zhou--UP
Explicit vs.
statistical targeting in
affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam
schools
Umut Dur,
Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun
Sönmez
Coalitional
bargaining with consistent
counterfactuals
Roberto
Burguet, Ramon Caminal--UP
Who will
watch the watchers? On optimal
monitoring networks
Wang Xiang
Reverse
Calculus and nested optimization
Andrew
Clausen, Carlo Strub
Information
disclosure and full surplus
extraction in mechanism design
Daniel
Krähmer
An
informational rationale for action
over disclosure
Alexandre N.
Kohlhas
Equilibrium
refinement for a model of
non-monocentric internal structures of cities: A potential
game approach
Minoru
Osawa, Takashi Akamatsu--UP
On the
existence of monotone
pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with
complementarities
Jeffrey
Mensch--UP
Promises and
endogenous reneging costs
Yuval
Heller, David Sturrock--UP
Subgame-perfect
cooperation in an
extensive game
Parkash
Chander, Myrna Wooders--UP
Assortative
matching with network
spillovers
Andreas
Bjerre-Nielsen--UP
Asymptotically
optimal prior-free clock
auctions
Simon
Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
Inefficient
sorting under output
sharing
Wing Tung
Lam
The moral
hazard problem with high
stakes
Hector
Chade, Jeroen Swinkels
Learning
rivals' information in
interdependent value auctions
Jinwoo Kim,
Youngwoo Koh--UP