Games and Economic Behavior, January 2019
Green Table of Contents
Special
section-Algorithmic Game Theory
A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
Berthold Všcking
Pages 4-16
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Konstantinos Georgiou, Chaitanya Swamy
Pages 17-37
Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)
Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Katrina Ligett, Yishay Mansour, Svetlana Olonetsky
Pages 38-57
Competitive contagion in networks
Sanjeev Goyal, Hoda Heidari, Michael Kearns
Pages 58-79
Optimal crowdsourcing contests
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian Sivan
Pages 80-96
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
Pages 97-115
Link to text. (slightly different title)
Regular
articles
Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
Francesc DilmŽ
Pages 116-136
Promises, expectations & causation
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa, Francesco Passarelli
Pages 137-146
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment
Flip Klijn, Joana Pais, Marc Vorsatz
Pages 147-163
On equilibria in games with imperfect recall
Nicolas S. Lambert, Adrian Marple, Yoav Shoham
Pages 164-185
Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game
Ari Stern, Alexander Tettenhorst
Pages 186-198
Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
Bertan Turhan
Pages 199-208
Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
Indranil Chakraborty
Pages 209-222
Link to text (not currently available in green)
Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
Yuval Heller, Erik Mohlin
Pages 223-247
Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions
F. Javier Mart’nez-de-AlbŽniz, Carlos Rafels, Neus Ybern
Pages 248-261
Regime change in large information networks
Joan de Mart’, Pau Mil‡n
Pages 262-284
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
Mat’as Nœ–ez, Marcus Pivato
Pages 285-305
Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media
Shintaro Miura
Pages 306-338
Polyequilibrium
Igal Milchtaich
Pages 339-355
Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response
Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai, Wooyoung Lim
Pages 356-380
Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: When are evolutionary models reliable?
Daniel Stephenson
Pages 381-395
The instability of matching with overconfident agents
Siqi Pan
Pages 396-415
Credit auctions and bid caps
David Lagziel
Pages 416-422
Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions
Yves Breitmoser
Pages 423-447
Gossip and the efficiency of interactions
Dietmar Fehr, Matthias Sutter
Pages 448-460
The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting
Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan, Jean-Robert Tyran
Pages 461-481
How to choose your victim
Klaus Abbink, GšnŸl Doğan
Pages 482-496
Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy?
Paolo Roberti
Pages 497-514
Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: A strategic perspective
Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh
Pages 515-532
Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks
Itay P. Fainmesser
Pages 533-548
Testing models of belief bias: An experiment
Alexander Coutts
Pages 549-565
Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking
Luca Polonio, Giorgio Coricelli
Pages 566-586
The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games
Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yukio Koriyama, Angela Sutan, Marc Willinger
Pages 587-610
Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
Gagan Ghosh, Heng Liu
Pages 611-632
Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
Ryoji Sawa
Pages 633-650
Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge
Michael Kurschilgen, Isabel Marcin
Pages 651-672
Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm
Pages 673-693
Voting with public information
Shuo Liu
Pages 694-719
A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining
Juan Ortner
Pages 720-733
The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games
Henk Norde
Pages 734-742
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, Daniel Gottlieb
Pages 743-755
Contests between groups of unknown size
Luke Boosey, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin
Pages 756-769
Belief-updating rule and sequential reciprocity
Lianjie Jiang, Jiabin Wu
Pages 770-780