Games and Economic Behavior
Green Table of Contents
  
Volume
119
Pages
1-392 (January 2020)
 
 
    Myopic perception
in repeated games
        Miguel Aramendia, Quan Wen
Pages 1-14
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Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of
Prat & Rustichini's model
    Ludwig Ensthaler, Steffen Huck, Johannes Leutgeb
Pages 30-55
Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
    Pak Hung Au,
Keiichi Kawai
Pages 56-78
Agency, potential and contagion
    Jonathan Newton,
Damian Sercombe
Pages 79-97
On the roots of the intrinsic value of decision rights:
Experimental evidence
    João V. Ferreira,
Nobuyuki Hanaki, Benoît Tarroux
    Pages 110-122
 
The attraction effect and its explanations
    Geoffrey Castillo
    Pages 123-147
 
Rehabilitation and social behavior: Experiments in prison
    Loukas Balafoutas, Aurora García-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzis, Tarek Jaber-Lopez, Evangelos Mitrokostas
Pages 148-171
 
Entry-deterring agency
    Simon Loertscher, Andras Niedermayer
Pages 172-188
 
Dominance rationality: A unified approach
    John Hillas, Dov Samet
Pages 189-196
Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to
ambiguity
    Gabriel Ziegler, Peio Zuazo-Garin
    Pages 197-215
 
Compromise and coordination: An experimental study
    Simin He, Jiabin Wu
Pages 216-233
 
Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game
    Chiara Margaria
Pages 234-250
When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group
strategy-proof?
    Jun Zhang
Pages 251-266
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The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental
auctions
    Charles N. Noussair, Gyula Seres
Pages 267-287
 
Perfect and proper equilibria in large games
    Xiang Sun, Yishu Zeng
Pages 288-308
Rational altruism? On preference estimation and dictator
game experiments
    Philip D. Grech, Heinrich H. Nax
    Pages 309-338
 
Present-bias, procrastination and deadlines in a field
experiment
    Alberto Bisin, Kyle Hyndman
Pages 339-357
 
Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random
fluctuations
    Jin Li, Michael Powell
Pages 358-382
 
Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins
    Eilon Solan, Omri
N. Solan, Ron Solan
    Pages 383-391
Notes
 
    The impossibility
of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for
fractional matching
        Samson Alva, Vikram Manjunath
Pages 15-29
 
Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general
elections
    Dan Bernhardt,
Meenakshi Ghosh
Pages 98-104
Can specialization be optimal when tasks are complementary?
    Renjie Bao, Sanxi Li, Jun Yu
Pages 105-109
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