Journal of Mathematical Economics, May 2019
Green Table of Contents
Volume 82
Pages 1-290 (May 2019)
Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari
Pages 1-30
On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari
Pages 31-60
Revealed preference and the subjective state space hypothesis
Fernando Payró
Pages 61-68
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The structure of useful topologies
Gianni Bosi, Gerhard Herden
Pages 69-73
Pages 61-68
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The curse of long horizons
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath
Pages 74-89
Bargaining with learning
Tanjim Hossain
Pages 90-97
Lipschitz recursive equilibrium with a minimal state space and heterogeneous agents
Rodrigo Raad, Łukasz Woźny
Pages 98-111
Greater Arrow–Pratt (Absolute) risk aversion of higher orders
Liqun Liu, Kit Pong Wong
Pages 112-124
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Procedural rationality, asset heterogeneity and market selection
Guillaume Coqueret, Bertrand Tavin
Pages 125-149
Growth and bubbles: Investing in human capital versus having children
Xavier Raurich, Thomas Seegmuller
Pages 150-159
Link to preprint (slightly different title, similar abstract)
A nonparametric test of quasiconcave production function with variable returns to scale
Sung-Ko Li
Pages 160-170
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The finite horizon, undiscounted, durable goods monopoly problem with finitely many consumers
Gerardo Berbeglia, Peter Sloan, Adrian Vetta
Pages 171-183
The hedgehog’s dilemma
Alvaro Sandroni
Pages 184-196
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Equilibrium existence in games: Slight single deviation property and Ky Fan minimax inequality
Vincenzo Scalzo
Pages 197-201
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Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
Nikolaus Schweizer, Nora Szech
Pages 202-213
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent
Pages 214-226
Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
Brian Baisa, Justin Burkett
Pages 227-246
Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
Takashi Kunimoto
Pages 247-263
An axiomatic characterization of the price–money message mechanism for economies with satiation
Hiromi Murakami, Ken Urai
Pages 264-271
Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
Ning Chen, Mengling Li
Pages 272-284
Link to preprint. (Slightly different title, similar abstract)
A task-allocation problem
Mustafa Og̃uz Afacan
Pages 285-290
Green copy not found