Journal of Economic Theory,  March 2019
Green Table of Contents

Volume 180
Pages 1-438


On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations

Kym Pram

Pages 1-10

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Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games

Wei He, Yeneng Sun

Pages 11-49

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Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers

Daeyoung Jeong

Pages 50-80

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Matching with single-peaked preferences

Sophie Bade

Pages 81-99

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Opportunistic conformism

Gary Charness, Michael Naef, Alessandro Sontuoso

Pages 100-134

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Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security

Charles Z. Zheng

Pages 135-166

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Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable

Jun Zhang

Pages 167-177

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Pivotal persuasion

Jimmy Chan, Seher Gupta, Fei Li, Yun Wang

Pages 178-202

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Inattention and belief polarization

Kristoffer P. Nimark, Savitar Sundaresan

Pages 203-228

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Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization

Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers, Arunava Sen

Pages 229-243

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Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules

Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko

Pages 244-273

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Communication under language barriers

Francesco Giovannoni, Siyang Xiong

Pages 274-303

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Learning about analysts

Jesper RŸdiger, Adrien Vigier

Pages 304-335

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Repeated implementation: A practical characterization

Helmuts Āzacis, PŽter Vida

Pages 336-367

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Unique monetary equilibrium with inflation in a stationary BewleyÐAiyagari model

Tai-Wei Hu, Eran Shmaya

Pages 368-382

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Optimal learning before choice

T. Tony Ke, J. Miguel Villas-Boas

Pages 383-437

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