Journal
of Economic Theory, July 2020
Green Table
of Contents
Weakening
transferable utility: The
case of non-intersecting Pareto curves
Thomas
Demuynck, Tom Potoms--UP
Coordination
motives and competition
for attention in information markets
Simone
Galperti, Isabel Trevino
The optimal
quantity of money and
partially-liquid assets
Ugo Zannini
Network
formation with multigraphs and
strategic complementarities
Sumit Joshi,
Ahmed Saber Mahmud,
Sudipta Sarangi
Strategy-proof
multi-object mechanism design:
Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra,
Shigehiro Serizawa--UP
Costly
auction entry, royalty payments,
and the optimality of asymmetric designs
Dan
Bernhardt, Tingjun Liu, Takeharu
Sogo--UP
Calibrated
uncertainty
Faruk Gul,
Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Repeated
delegation
Elliot
Lipnowski, João Ramos
The
permissible and the forbidden
Michael
Richter, Ariel Rubinstein
Multigenerational
transmission of
culture
Daniel
Spiro--UP
The scope of
sequential screening with
ex post participation constraints
Dirk
Bergemann, Francisco Castro,
Gabriel Y. Weintraub--UP
Implementation
of assortative matching
under incomplete information
Naomi
Utgoff--UP
How noise
affects effort in tournaments
Mikhail
Drugov, Dmitry Ryvkin
A general
theory of subjective mixtures
Paolo
Ghirardato, Daniele Pennesi--UP
Too much
waste, not enough rationing:
The failure of stochastic, competitive markets
David de
Meza, Francesco Reito
Green
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Dynamic
reserves in matching markets
Orhan Aygün,
Bertan Turhan--UP
Buyer-optimal
extensionproof
information
Stefan
Terstiege, Cédric Wasser
Robust
equilibrium outcomes in
sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
Satoru
Takahashi, Olivier Tercieux
Just-noticeable
difference as a
behavioural foundation of the critical cost-efficiency index
Paweł
Dziewulski
Reversals of
signal-posterior
monotonicity imply a bias of screening
Sander
Heinsalu--UP
Corrigendum
to “An impossibility
theorem for wealth in heterogeneous-agent models with limited
heterogeneity”
[Journal of Economic Theory 182 (2019) 1–24]
John
Stachurski, Alexis Akira Toda