Name $\qquad$

Final Exam, Economics 210A, December 2012
There are 8 questions. Answer as many as you can... Good luck!

1) Let $S$ and $T$ be convex sets in Euclidean $n$ space. Let $S+T$ be the set $\{x \mid x=s+t$ for some $s \in S$ and some $t \in T\}$. For any real number $a$, and any set $S$, let $a S=\{x \mid x=a s$ for some $s \in S\}$ For each of the following statements, tell me whether it is true of false. If true, prove it. If false, give a counterexample.

All three statements are true:
A) $S+T$ is a convex set

Proof: Let $x$ and $y$ be elements of $S+T$ and let $z=\lambda x+(1-\lambda) y$ for $\lambda \in[0,1]$. Then $x=s+t$ for some $s \in S$ and $t \in T$ and $y=s^{\prime}+t^{\prime}$ for some $s^{\prime} \in S$ and $t^{\prime} \in T$. Therefore $z=\lambda s+\lambda t+(1-\lambda) s^{\prime}+(1-\lambda) t^{\prime}=$ $\left(\lambda s+(1-\lambda) s^{\prime}\right)+\left(\lambda t+(1-\lambda) t^{\prime}\right)$. Since $S$ and $T$ are convex sets, it must be that $s_{\lambda}=\left(\lambda s+(1-\lambda) s^{\prime}\right) \in S$ and $t_{\lambda}=\left(\lambda t+(1-\lambda) t^{\prime}\right) \in T$. Therefore $z=s_{\lambda}+t_{\lambda} \in S+T$.
B) $a S$ is a convex set if $a$ is a positive real number.

This is a special case of Part C, proved below.
C) $a S$ is a convex set if $a$ is any real number.

Proof: Let $x \in a S$ and $y \in a S$. Then $x=$ as and $y=a s^{\prime}$ for some $s$ and $s^{\prime}$ in $S$. Let $z=\lambda x+(1-\lambda) y$. Then $x=\lambda a s+(1-\lambda) a s^{\prime}=a\left(\lambda t+(1-\lambda) t^{\prime}\right)$ Since $S$ is a convex set, it must be that $\left(\lambda t+(1-\lambda) t^{\prime}\right) \in S$ and therefore $a x=a\left(\lambda t+(1-\lambda) t^{\prime}\right) \in a S$.
2) A firm has production function $f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=\left(x_{1}-a\right)^{1 / 4}\left(x_{2}-b\right)^{3 / 4}$, where $a$ and $b$ are non-negative constants, and $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ are input quantities. The firm can buy factor 1 at price $w_{1}$ per unit and factor 2 at price $w_{2}$ per unit.
A) What is this firm's cost function if $a=b=0$ ?

$$
c\left(w_{1}, w_{2}, y\right)=y w_{1}^{1 / 4} w_{2}^{3 / 4}\left(3^{3 / 4}+3^{1 / 4}\right)
$$

B) What is this firm's cost function for general $a$ and $b$ ?
C) What is this firm's conditional factor demand function for factor 1 , for general $a$ and $b$ ?
3) Jake has expenditure function $e\left(p_{1}, p_{2}, u\right)=u \sqrt{p_{1} p_{2}}$. Jane has utility function $u\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=a x_{1}^{3} x_{2}^{b}+c$.
A) Find the Marshallian demand functions for each of the two consumers.
B) For what values of the parameters $a, b$, and $c$ will aggregate demand be independent of the distribution of income?
4) Petraus is an expected utility maximizer with von Neumann Morgenstern utility function $u(w)=\ln w$. He is offered a chance to bet on the outcome of a flip of a coin that he believes will come up heads with probability $\pi$. If he bets $x$, he will have wealth $w+y$ if the coin comes up heads and $w-x$ if it comes up tails.
A) If $y=x$, solve for the optimal amount $x$ for him to bet as a function of $\pi$ and $w$.

$$
x=(2 \pi-1) w .
$$

b) If $y=x-c$ for some $c>0$, solve for the optimal amount for him to bet as a function of $\pi$ and $w$.
$x=(2 \pi-1) w+(1-\pi) c$. Notice that in this problem, if the coin comes up heads, he will have to pay an amount $c$ no matter what he bets.
5) A pure exchange economy has 5,000 consumers and 3 goods $X, Y$, and $Z$. Every consumer $i$ in the economy has utility function

$$
U_{i}\left(x_{i}, y_{i}, z_{i}\right)=\left(x_{i}^{1 / 2}+y_{i}^{1 / 2}+z_{i}^{1 / 2}\right)^{2}
$$

where $x_{i}, y_{i}$, and $z_{i}$ are $i$ 's consumption of $X, Y$, and $Z$, respectively. There are 3 types of consumers. There are 2,000 Type 1 consumers and each has an initial endowment of 4 units of good $x$ and 0 units of goods $y$ and $z$. There are 1000 Type 2 consumers and each has an initial endowment of 2 units of good $y$ and 0 units of goods $x$ and $z$. There are 2000 Type 3 consumers and each has an initial endowment of 1 unit of good $z$ and 0 units of goods $x$ and $y$.
A) Let Good $X$ be the numeraire good and find competitive equilibrium prices for Goods $Y$ and $Z$.

Since all consumers have identical homothetic utility functions, it must be that for any price vector, all consumers consume the three goods in the same proportions. In equilibrium, these proportions must be the same as the proportions in which the three goods are available. There are a total of $4 \times 2000=8000$ units of good $X, 2 \times 1000=2000$ units of good $Y$, and $1 \times 2000=2000$ units of good $Z$ available in the market. In equilibrium, therefore each consumer must consume goods in the ratio of four units of good $X$ per unit of good $Y$ and four units of good $X$ per unit of good $Z$. With the given utility function, a consumer who consumes the bundle ( $x, y, z$ ) must marginal rate of substitutions

$$
\frac{u_{Y}(x, y, z)}{u_{X}(x, y, z)}=\left(\frac{x}{y}\right)^{1 / 2}
$$

and

$$
\frac{u_{Z}(x, y, z)}{u_{X}(x, y, z)}=\left(\frac{x}{z}\right)^{1 / 2} .
$$

Since each consumer must consume 4 times as much $X$ as of $Y$ or $Z$, and since $X$ is the numeraire, it follows that the equilibrium prices for $p_{y}$ and $p_{z}$ must be 2.
B) Compare the "income" (value of initial endowment) of a Type 1 consumer with that of a Type 2 consumer and with that of a Type 3 consumer. What is the total value of initial endowments at competitive equilibrium prices?

The income of a type 1 consumer will be $4 \times 1=4$, that of a type 2 consumer will be $2 \times w=4$ and that of a type 3 will be $1 \times 2=2$.
C) In competitive equilibrium, how much Good $X$ does a Type 1 consume? How much Good $X$ does a Type 2 consume? How much Good $X$ does a Type 3 consume?

Since the Type 1's and 2's are twice as rich as the type 3's and have the same homothetic preferences, they will each consume twice as much of any good as a type 3. There are a total of $2,000 \times 4=8,000$ units of Good $X$ available. Let $x$ be the amount consumed by a good 3. Then $2000 x+1000 \times$ $(2 x)+2,000 \times(2 x)=8,000$. Therefore $x=1$. Each Type 3 consumes 1 unit of $X$, each type 2 consumes 2 units of $X$ and each type 1 consumes 2 units of $X$
D) A natural disaster strikes the suppliers of Good 1 and reduces the initial endowment of each Type 1 consumer from 4 units of good $X$ to 1 unit of good $X$. What are the prices in the new competitive equilibrium?

In the new equilibrium, compare the value of the endowment of a Type 1 consumer with that of a Type 2 consumer and that of a Type 3 consumer.

After the disaster, the total endowment of each good is 2,000 units. In equilibrium, the prices of all three goods must be the same. With good 1 as the numeraire, all three prices are 1 . The value of the initial endowments of types 1 and 3 are 1 and the value of the initial endowment of the type 2 's is 2.
6) Consider an economy in which endowments are as in the previous problem, before the natural disaster, but utility functions are

$$
U_{i}\left(x_{i}, y_{i}, z_{i}\right)=\left(x_{i}^{-1 / 2}+y_{i}^{-1 / 2}+z_{i}^{-1 / 2}\right)^{-2}
$$

A) Find the competitive prices for this economy.

With these utility functions, it must be that in equilibrium with good 1 as numeraire, $p_{1}=1, p_{2}=p_{3}=8$.
B) Compare the "income" (value of initial endowment) of a Type 1 consumer with that of a Type 2 consumer and with that of a Type 3 consumer.

In this case the values of initial endowments are 4 for type 1's 16 for type 2's and 8 for type 3's. C) Suppose that in this economy a natural
disaster strikes the suppliers of Good 1 and reduces the initial endowment of each Type 1 consumer from 4 units of good $X$ to 1 unit of good X. What are the prices in the new competitive equilibrium? In the new equilibrium, compare the value of the endowment of a Type 1 consumer with that of a Type 2 consumer and that of a Type 3 consumer.

After the disaster, the quantities of all three goods become 2,000 and their equilibrium prices are all 1. So the Type 1's and Type 2's have incomes of 2 and the type 3's have income 1.
D) (For extra credit) In this case would Type 1's benefit from the disaster? Can you say anything more general about when a type would gain (lose) if the endowments of everyone of that type were to increase (decrease)?

7 ) Consider a three-dimensional surface described as follows. Where $x$ is its East-West coordinate and $y$ is its North-South coordinate, let z be its up-down coordinate. The height of the surface (measured in inches above sea-level) at the point with coordinates $x$ and $y$ is $z=x y^{2}+x^{3} y$.
A) What is the gradient of this surface where $x=4$ and $y=-2$ ?
B) Suppose that a fly traveling along this surface is at the point that has $x, y$ coordinates $(x, y)=(4,-2)$ and is traveling in the direction $(1 / \sqrt{10}, 3 / \sqrt{10})$ in these coordinates. What is the vertical slope of the surface in the direction the fly is traveling? Is it going up or down?
C) If the fly is situated at the point with $(x, y)$ coordinates $(4,-2)$, in what direction should it move to climb most steeply along the surface? (Describe this direction as a vector of length 1.)

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8 ) We have a data set consisting 100 observations of commodity vectors $x_{j}$ and price vectors $p_{j}$ such that a certain consumer bought $x_{j}$ when the price vector was $p_{j}$. We define the relations $\succeq_{R}$ and $\succ_{R}$ over commodity bundles such that $x_{j} \succeq_{R} x_{k}$ if $p_{j} x_{j} \geq p_{j} x_{k}$ and $x_{j} \succ_{R} x_{k}$ if $p_{j} x_{j}>p_{k} x_{k}$.

Suppose that this consumer has preferences that are locally non-satiated and transitive but not necessarily convex. From any budget the consumer chooses one of the best bundles that he can afford. Must it be true that if $x_{i} \succeq_{R} x_{j}$ and $x_{j} \succeq_{R} x_{k}$, then NOT $x_{k} \succ x_{i}$. If so, prove it. If not, show $a$ counterexample.

